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1 Introduction
In a development context, the importance of
tropical agro-commodities (mainly tropical crops,
traded in a bulk form on a global basis) should not
need underlining. From around 1930 onwards
their main source of supply ceased to be
plantations and became peasant. It was thereby
mainly on the basis of their cultivation that the
mass of the populations of poor countries became
connected to development interventions, to their
own (colonial and post-colonial) states and to the
world economy. Even today, in a context where
their terms of trade are experiencing a severe
secular decline and where rural development
interventions mainly concern food crops, agro-
commodities remain a main strand linking the
world's rural poor with global product markets.
According to the latest available data on world
agricultural trade, the main seven tropical agro-
commodities (coffee, tobacco, cotton, sugar,
rubber, tea and cocoa) still accounted for 61.8 per
cent of the total agricultural exports of all LDCs
during the period 1996-99 (FAOSTAT 2000).'
This article outlines some of the special features of
value chains for tropical agro-commodities in the
first years of the 2 ist century. This involves a
largely implicit comparison with chains for other
kinds of products. However, grasping the novel
features of these chains today mainly involves a
comparison between them and those for the same
commodities, during what will be called the
classical' phase of their development, roughly the
period from the 1930s down to around 1990. The
discussion will particularly focus on cotton, coffee,
cocoa and rubber. Together, the value of trade in
these four commodities has always exceeded those
of the others mentioned above, while at the same
time their value chains have had very similar
features. The chains for tea, tobacco and cane sugar
differ considerably both from these crops and from
each other.
The article employs Gereffi's (1994) basic
framework for describing global commodity chains
(GCCs), namely in terms of their input/output
structures and geography, and their governance
and institutional structures. The last of these is
interpreted in terms of formal organisational
frameworks, rather than 'rules of the gaine' as it
would be in the new institutional economics.
Rules of the game' are treated in value-chain
analysis, but mainly in relation to governance by
and for lead agents; indeed, asserting this
connection is one of the most distinctive (and
original) features of Gereffi's contribution. The
article also borrows, though not uncritically,
Gereffi's basic dichotomy between 'producer'- and
buyer-driven chains. In addition, and in keeping
with the development dimension of the topic, it
discusses processes, constraints and opportunities
for upgrading. The article is divided into two main
sections, corresponding to the historical periods
1930-90 and 1990 to the present.
2 The 'Classical' Phase of Tropical
Agro-commodity Trade, 1930-90
2.1 Input-output structure and geography
Because it has been based mainly on rain-fed
agriculture, the global supply pattern for the
commodities discussed here has always been
seasonally uneven. At the same time, it has been
highly dispersed geographically. In comparison
with other products, however, perhaps its most
distinctive feature in this period was that most
individual sources of supply were state-owned or
-regulated export monopolies in tropical countries.
These had emerged in some countries for some
crops already in the 1920s, but became generalised
to most crops in most exporting countries in the
two decades after the Second World War. This
experience was shared by African and Asian
colonies of the European powers and by indep-
endent states in Latin America.
State involvement in the propagation and
marketing of these crops was associated with a
dramatic reduction in entry barriers to their
cultivation. State agencies introduced credit-based
input systems for smaliholders, together with
supporting extension services delivered without
fees, widely diffused marketing institutions and
sometimes price stabilisation mechanisms. On this
basis, the production systems for these commod-
ities became reconstituted from a plantation to a
peasant basis. However, this transformation carried
with it the danger of global over-supply, especially
as demand for most of these commodities was
either income inelastic (coffee, cocoa) or was
inelastic due to substitution by industrial products
(man-made fibres, plastics).
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To offset this tendency, individual producing states
sponsored international producer associations.
From the early 1950s the associations for coffee,
cocoa, natural rubber and cane sugar initiated
efforts to control prices. These efforts took two
forms: buffer stock agreements whereby an
association bought up world surpluses in order to
set a designated price, and export control whereby
it set national export quotas instead. These
associations were highly successful in controlling
prices, for a period of around 30 years (see Bates
1997 on the International Coffee Organisation).
While world supply of these commodities was
dispersed between tropical countries, world
demand (except, increasingly, in the case of cotton)
was relatively concentrated in a handful of indus-
trialised ones, Yet while concentrated geograph-
ically, demand was nevertheless segmented in
distinct ways. Within particular industrial countries
there were often preferences for highly specific
blends or combinations of a crop.2
Lastly it is important to note that throughout this
period trade was in a bulk form with commodities
themselves differentiated in only very simple ways.
For trading purposes they were distinguished
according to a few basic physical properties (e.g. in
the case of cotton, fibre length, strength and
maturity), plus the level of presence of impurities,
plus the country of origin. Thus individual state
marketing monopolies also represented a kind of
trademark.
2.2 Governance and institutional
structures
Some central elements of the governance
structures of these chains have already been
touched upon. Major coordinative roles
horizontally were performed by state export-
marketing monopolies, and at an international
level, in the cases of coffee, cocoa and rubber, by
producer associations. State export-marketing
organisations valorised the production of crops
through supplying inputs on credit, supplying free
extension services and maintaining quality
controls. They ensured uniform quality standards
and recovered credit on the basis of their export
monopolies. They also exercised coordination
through control over prices for both capital inputs
and output, in the latter case through setting
prices on both a pan-territorial and a pan-seasonal
basis and (outside of the Anglophone world)
through season-on-season price stabilisation.
These national producer-country-based systems of
price stabilisation, and to a large extent also those
of product valorisation, depended implicitly on a
degree of producer-country control over world
prices. Obviously, domestic price stabilisation
would become difficult if prices were to fall in a
sustained way on the world market.
Although national export organisations coordinated
these chains horizontally, they did not do so
vertically. This role was performed instead by a
small number of international trading or trading-
brokering companies. These companies, head-
quartered in the US (e.g. Cargill) or in Europe's
traditional trading centres (E. D. & E Man, Louis
Dreyfus, Paul Reinhart, etc.) operated mostly on a
bulk basis across several different commodities,
enabling them to take advantage of economies of
scale in transport, storage and finance. The form of
vertical coordination that they undertook, at least in
the period 1930-90, was mainly of an 'arm-1ength'
kind. It involved a loose system of multiple and
often quite temporary contract-based relations with
particular suppliers and end-users, which covered
only the exchange of the commodity in question.
Sales were usually in a forward rather than spot
position, since national exporters could guarantee
predictability of quality (and, in a few cases,
volume), and were often arranged on a tender basis.
International traders were only very exceptionally
involved in direct production.
The major coordinative mechanisms linking
suppliers with international traders were the simple
and inclusive quality conventions' for the
commodities in question, used to differentiate the
product into various grades according to national
origin and certain crude physical properties of the
commodity itself. The grading matrixes arising out
of these conventions were the bases for the systems
of price premia and discounts prevailing in the
trade. Given their focus on crude physical
properties, easily subject to modification by
producers themselves, it comes as little surprise to
find that the matrixes in question were often
constructed with producers' or producer-country
governments' involvement. Although traders also
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played an important role in the determination of the
standard quality matrix for rubber and cocoa, that
for cotton is based on the US Department of
Agriculture classification - in turn devised by the
main producers' organisation of the US, for a long
period the world leading exporter. Producers not
only participated in setting quality conventions,
but in the process also managed to transfer some of
the cost of monitoring quality to traders. These
were usually obliged to monitor quality/conformity
with product description on an ex-post basis by
sampling.
Despite the importance to it of the distinction
between producer- and buyer-driven commodity
chains, there is surprisingly little discussion in GCC
analysis of producer-driven chains. In Gereffi
original (1994) discussion they are identified with
highly capital- and technology-intensive industries
'in which (manufacturing) TNCs or other large
integrated industrial enterprises play the central
role . . .What distinguishes 'producer-driven'
production systems is the control exercised by the
administrative headquarters of.. .TNCs.' Unlike in
the case of buyer-driven chains, there is no separate
discussion of the governance structures that this
involves, except to suggest that they entail detailed
control over dedicated subcontractors. These agro-
commodity chains, in the period described here,
did not resemble this pattern at all. They were not
driven by manufacturing TNCs and did not involve
'dedicated' supply relations of any kind. Market
relations predominated over hierarchical ones. But
producers participated actively in setting the rules
of the game, both in price terms and in terms of
arbitrating quality and the relation of quality to
price.
After 1980, 'producer-drivenness' in these agro-
commodity chains began to wane. This reflected a
number of developments, of which the first
chronologically was the collapse of international
producer cartels. In most cases this was the result of
the emergence of major new producing countries,
mostly in Asia, attracted to production by the price
levels that the cartels achieved. These countries
either could not be accommodated in existing
cartels, or - where they were - could not be made
to follow their rules. As a result, markets became
saturated. As producers subsequently lost control,
so international traders became more powerful. On
the other hand, where the latter now drove these
chains, it continued to be mainly in a hands-off way
Other than the frameworks of public intervention
and regulation at national level, and of collective
international regulation between producing states,
the main formal institutions playing a role in these
chains were international commodity exchanges
and the futures markets organised around them.
Most transactions between international traders
and industrial consumers were organised on a
private treaty basis and by-passed commodity
exchanges (usually based in London or New York).
But traders, consumers and organisations of
producers of tropical commodity based in sub-
tropical regions of developed countries (the US and
Australia in the case of cotton) occasionally sold
surpluses or made up deficits through these mar-
kets. In addition all three groups, as well as private
speculators, used futures markets to hedge risk and
seek windfall gains.
2.3 Upgrading opportunities
Participation in these chains provided suppliers
with clear but relatively restricted opportunities for
upgrading. Since these chains' guiding regulative
and pricing framework was premised on
promulgating the interests of state-led smaliholder
production, there were no incentives for product
upgrading beyond a level attainable by properly
supervised' smallholder producers. In the case of
cotton, for example, product upgrading simply
corresponded to assuring good quality seed supply
(of long staple seed where this could be grown, of
short staple seed elsewhere), applying pesticides in
a way which minimised crop contamination,
picking the crop only when it was mature, and
selling it in a clean state.
Process upgrading towards more capital-intensive
production forms was possible, for example by
irrigating land in order to produce two crops a year,
by developing more efficient seeds/seedlings, by
employing more intensive pesticide regimes and by
introducing mechanical picking. However, the main
rewards this entailed related to savings on labour -
and were therefore confined to sub-tropical regions
of developed countries where labour was costly3
Some prevailing regulative and pricing frameworks
even further penalised mechanically picked crop
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with a price discount, on the assumption that such
crop was more likely to be damaged. Thus, process
upgrading was of little relevance in developing
countries.
The prevailing regulative system facilitated three
types of functional upgrading, which national
producers in developing countries exploited in a
widespread manner. The first of these was to
occupy new commercial functions/roles, over and
above those of selling crop to international traders
on a spot basis and by private treaty As already
indicated, these roles included using forward and
tender f.o.b. sales (both possible because national
regulative systems allowed rough predictions of
volumes, grades and delivery dates) and appoint-
ment of overseas agents to make direct sales to
industrial processors, thus by-passing international
traders. In the case of a handful of better-off devel-
oping countries it also meant using futures markets
to hedge risk.
The second was to gain control of part of the
international transport of agro-commodities by
establishing their own shipping lines. This was
underwritten by the UNCTAD Code of Conduct,
under which developing countries secured the right
to transport up to 40 per cent of their foreign trade
through their own domestic lines.
The third was the localisation of raw material
processing. There are some forms of primary raw
material processing in relation to these crops that
had to be undertaken in tropical countries in order
to qualify them for export. These include ginning
for cotton and hulling to produce 'green coffee'.
However, secondary processing (e.g. roasting in the
case of coffee, grinding in the case of cocoa) was
normally confined to developed countries. Amongst
the group of agro-commodities considered here
cotton is an exception, since spinning industries -
which have low capital requirements - were present
in some developing countries well before the
Second World War. Otherwise, national producers
strove to localise secondary processing of agro-
commodities (and other raw materials) throughout
this period.
However, there were two practical reasons why
localisation in the case of this group of agro-
commodities was not pursued as actively as in those
of other raw materials. One was that processor and
consumer preferences normally favoured blends of
different national varieties, implying generally
lower returns in export markets for single variety-
based products.4 A second was that many secondary
processing technologies prevailing in these chains
made it imperative that processing took place
within a short time of end-consumption. The effects
were similar in both cases: secondary processing in
developing countries themselves was practical only
for local consumption. For national producers to
upgrade into secondary processing for developed-
country markets, they would have had to develop
new technologies or relocate to these markets
themselves. Both options were extremely resource-
demanding, while undertaking the second seems
likely to have threatened the consent of key
importing countries to the continuation of
international commodity agreements. Thus, while
there were widespread and generally successful
attempts to upgrade into secondary processing by
developing-country producers, these were almost
all confined to production for local and regional
markets.
3 Agro-commodity Chain
Restructuring since 19go
3.1 Input-output structure and geography
The last decade has seen a partial disintegration of
agro-commodity chains as they were organised
between 1930 and 1990, and their reconstitution in
new forms. There now appears to be a much greater
degree of 'filamentation' of chains, and a greater
diversity in the principles governing their
organisation. Likewise, old upgrading opportunities
have become more restricted and new ones have
opened up.
As far as chains' inputoutput structures are
concerned, the clearest changes are noticeable in
relation to the supply function. As a result of the
implementation of structural adjustment policies,
most producer country markets have been
liberalised and former state marketing monopolies
commercialised, privatised or liquidated. A variety
of different local market structures have developed
subsequently, of which three are most common.
Either free competition has ensued over an entire
territory between large numbers of private
exporters, often followed after a few years by a
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process of differentiation/re-concentration. Or,
national markets have been divided up into distinct
geographical monopolies, each let to a large-scale -
often foreign - private trader. Or, privatised former
state marketing monopolies have remained
powerful and have retained substantial, if not
dominant, market shares. The first and second of
these scenarios appears more common than the
third (for cotton in Africa see CIRAD 2000).
Liberalisation has been concomitant with the death
of distinctively national regulative or coordinative
systems, at least in the case of these first two
scenarios. National governments in developing
countries are now mostly unable to control or
predict crop quality or availability (in terms of
volume and timing). In turn, this has undermined
the effectiveness of attempts by producing countries
to revive international commodity agreements.
Consequently, secularly falling prices have been
accompanied by increasing price instability both in
international and domestic markets.
Changes on the demand side have been equally
profound, although more varied. Mostly, they
follow from the supply-side changes already
mentioned. The phenomena of market saturation
and falling prices following from the breakdown of
regulation by international producers has been
accompanied by that of falling supply predictability,
arising from the breakdown of national market
regulation. For international traders, these develop-
ments have translated into falling margins and
increased risk of contractual non-compliance. A
general consequence has been a strengthening of
the bargaining positions of upstream processors.
International traders have responded to this
scenario in different ways. Some have dropped out
of, or reduced their involvement in, international
commodity trade. For example, the owners of one
of the world's oldest and largest agro-commodity
trading companies, E. D. & E Man, sold up during
1 999-2000. Other former traders have converted
themselves into an exclusively brokerage role, at
least for those commodities most plagued by price
instability Others again have maintained an
existence as traders, but have diversified
downstream towards secondary processing, or
upstream towards crop production. The former is a
trend mainly in cocoa, the latter mainly in coffee.
Greater integration of trading and secondary
processing roles in cocoa can also be seen as a
spread of what Sturgeon calls 'turn-key production
systems' to agro-commodity sectors. Branded
marketing's heightened importance in many sectors
during the last two decades has been widely noted,
including by Gereffi (op. cit.), who linked it to new
types of out-sourcing and the consequent
emergence of 'buyer-driven commodity chains'.
According to Sturgeon (2000), however, this
development carried within it a kind of counter-
tendency towards the emergence of powerful
'contract manufacturers' specialising in manufact-
uring processes that could be used to supply a
series of different customers, and in the supply of
related producer services. Fold (2002) describes a
similar train of events in the cocoa-to-chocolate
segment of the cocoa chain. Chocolate manu-
facturers have increasingly specialised in designing,
'finishing', branding and marketing chocolate
products, while contracting-out to cocoa grinders
(on a JIT basis) the supply of dedicated inter-
mediate chocolate products. While from the
perspective of value-chain analysis this can be
validly seen as chocolate manufacturers successfully
externalising one of their lower-profit functions,
from the perspective of Sturgeon's analysis it can be
also seen as grinders successfully internalising a
higher-profit one. While it is unclear if this process
creates incentives for grinders to enter international
trading (see below), it certainly appears to increase
incentives for traders to enter grinding.
In the downstream coffee chain, where there is only
a single industrial process, it has been roasters
themselves who have expanded their branded
marketing role. In this process, the traditional
major players - especially in soluble (instant) coffee
- have rationalised, and appear to have insisted that
international traders continue to supply them at the
same levels of predictability and reliability that
predated international and national market
liberalisation. In this case, it has entailed
international traders diversifying upstream into
direct production (usually into premium varieties) 6
At the same time, the coffee chain has seen the rise
of a new generation of mini-roasters, mostly
producing for the 'gourmet coffee' market and some
of them dedicated to specific specialised coffee
outlets. This reflects a broader process of
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differentiation of consumer tastes for the commod-
ities under review, notable also in the rising markets
for luxury chocolates, 'free trade coffees', ecological
cottons, etc.
32 Governance and institutional
structures
Linked with these changes have been ones in chain
governance structures. In most developing countries,
states no longer play the role of valorising peasant
production through credit-based input schemes,
extension services, national systems of quality
control and pan-territorial pricing. Nor do they
coordinate exports. There are some exceptions, for
example Ghana for cocoa and Mali for cotton, but
reforms are in train here too. Private agents have
taken on these functions on a localised basis in a few
places where they enjoy monopolies, for example
through contract farming schemes. And in a few
instances - such as that of cotton in Zimbabwe -
private marketing oligopolies with a national scope
have arisen, meaning that important aspects of earlier
systems of coordination have been preserved (Larsen
2002). But, as already indicated, international
horizontal coordination between producing coun-
tries has disappeared almost entirely
Vertical coordination by international traders in
'arm's-length' forms persists and, in many respects,
has become more important in this context. But it is
now accompanied by a proliferation of more direct
(sometimes very direct) forms of vertical coord-
ination, some of it by international traders
themselves. In producing countries offering large
volumes, but where local exporters are financially
weak and only able to offer small volumes of crop,
or in a few other producing countries considered
strategic because they offer a unique crop variety,
international traders have often moved into direct
procurement. In a handful of producing countries
viewed as especially strategic because they
command very high shares of world production,
they have even moved into local secondary
processing - mainly to create political goodwill.7 At
the same time, and because direct procurement is
very resource-intensive, most international traders'
overall geographical coverage is shrinking.
A second, increasingly important new form of direct
vertical coordination involves the establishment of
relations between specialised industrial processors
based in developed countries and more or less
dedicated (groups of) suppliers in developing
countries. In one version of this relation, the
impetus arises mainly from the developed-country
processor and takes the form of a more or less
extended period of practical collaboration and,
finally certification. This is the case with the new
range of 'estate coffees', as well as with the
emergence of new homologised rubbers, especially
cultivated for so-called 'single-rubber tyres',
introduced by European lyre manufacturers partly
to avoid costs of blending (Daviron 2002). The
other version of this relation is similar, but is
initiated by already well-resourced (groups of)
private producers in developing countries who offer
themselves as longer-term partners to coffee mini-
roasters, upper-market European cotton spinners,
etc. There is no doubt that the share of world trade
coordinated in these ways is increasing in
importance.8
In their 'classical' periods, agro-commodity chains
were coordinated on the basis of simple, inclusive
quality conventions linking certain physical crop
qualities chosen by producers with price. Today, the
classical matrixes used to calibrate differences in
crop quality are being undermined or by-passed.
They are being especially undermined in their
national origin dimension, which has been almost
abandoned for some agro-commodities. Also with
regard to physical description/quality etc.,
increasing proportions of most agro-commodities
are being sold through international traders in
undifferentiated forms. This process has gone
furthest in cocoa, where the only nationally
denominated cocoa still recognised is Ghanaian
(which happens to be the only producing country
where a state marketing monopoly still plays an
important role) and where no other generic quality
classification is used at all. In the case of cocoa this
is linked to a change in processing technology
downstream, whereby poor bean quality can be
compensated for by longer processing, although
whether quality degradation or technological
innovation came first is unclear (see Fold 2002).
At the same time new 'buyer-' or, perhaps more
accurately, 'user-driven' quality conventions are
proliferating. These take a variety of forms,
corresponding partly to a distinction between
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'domestic' (identification by region or estate of
origin) and 'civic' (identification by the 'fairness' of
the transaction) conventions, but also including
conventions defining quality in entirely 'private'
ways, for example in terms of compatibility with
dedicated industrial processes (e.g. homologised
rubber). Besides being user-driven rather than
producer-driven, this group of conventions is novel
for agro-commodities in two other ways. First, they
no longer embody a transparent link to a publicly
agreed matrix of price premia and discounts; the
value to the producer of the quality attained is
determined simply by private negotiation.9 Second,
they are usually associated with buyers demanding
quality monitoring on an ex-ante rather than an ex-
post basis, and through procedures that involve
process certification rather than product testing (e.g.
ensuring that estates have EU regulation-conforming
pesticide residue regimes, rather than that each
consignment of coffee beans has a residue content
not exceeding that permitted). Underlying this trend
is a steady increase in the stringency of the food
safety/sanitary and phytosanitary requirements for
access to developed-country markets - or at least for
differentiated products. This makes their monitoring
increasingly costly and thereby leads to buyers
supporting measures which entail a transfer of these
costs to producers, in a way paralleling processes in
other buyer-driven value chains.
The institutional structures of classical agro-
commodity chains have been preserved by and
large during the last decade. But it appears to be
widely accepted that commodity futures markets
are taking on an increasingly autonomous existence
from the markets for physical commodities, and
that the roles of producers and industrial
consumers in them have diminished. Volumes
traded on futures markets have increased much
faster than physical volumes, and price movements
reflect (directly or inversely) trends in other
financial markets, rather than simply in crop supply
and demand. It is too soon to say whether new,
distinct institutions will emerge in relation to the
new forms of vertical coordination described, or
what they are likely to look like.
3.3 Upgrading
Most of the typical forms of producer upgrading
that were characteristic of the classical agro-
commodity chains are still available as options, at
least where elements of local horizontal
coordination remain. As an increasing share of
these trades is in commodities taking an
undifferentiated form and sold on a spot basis, and
as futures markets have taken on a life of their own,
so certain price spreads have increased. These
include those between good and undifferentiated
quality crops, between forward prices (with or
without tendering) and spot prices, between prices
from direct sales through agents and prices from
sales through international traders and between
returns from futures markets and returns from crop
markets. Therefore, the relative rewards for
product upgrading and for upgrading into new
commercial functions in traditional ways have
increased. On the other hand, absolute returns
have still diminished.
The economics of the localisation of processing of
traditional versions of the agro-commodities in
question appear not to have undergone much
change in the last decade. As indicated, there are
isolated examples of international trader-processors
increasing their investment in local processing, but
probably less for direct economic reasons than for
political and indirect economic ones.1° A relatively
new trend, but one still consistent with the
economics of the classical period, is for a few well-
off developing-country-based trader-processors to
upgrade by delocalising part of their processing
activities to developed countries, as has been the
case with the leading Ivorian-owned cocoa
company This tendency is associated with
privatisation, which has allowed a handful of
resourceful former parastatals to raise new capital in
financial markets"
The new opportunities for producer upgrading
arising from the emergence of novel forms of
vertical coordination, themselves regulated through
user-driven quality conventions, involve a unique
combination of product and process upgrading. On
the basis of strategic alliances with developed-
country traders or secondary processors or - in
some cases - retailers, developing country prod-
ucers are enabled to develop differentiated as
opposed to traditional commodities. In many cases,
as already indicated, this is linked to an obligatory
process upgrading, for example to production
processes conforming to developed country
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phytosanitary or pesticide residue requirements.
Such types of process upgrading do not necessarily
involve the adoption of capital-intensive
technologies such as irrigation, etc., but they may
only be economic for developing country producers
who have already achieved certain economies of
scale on the basis of some of these technologies.
As yet, the broader economics of this kind of
upgrading are still unclear. Certainly costs are
clearly high, while rewards are unpredictable and
not transparent. In addition, where the product
aspect of such upgrading is into end-user dedicated
products, this may be associated with 'competency
traps' stemming from their non-transferabïlity to
other end-users.
4 Conclusion
Daviron (2d02) has summed up the organisation of
classical agro-commodity chains under the rubric
'paysan, produit, pays': smallholder production of
largely undifferentiated crops under national systems
of regulation. The glue holding this organisation
together was a simple, inclusive quality convention
based on product standards. Today many of these
chains are in a process of semi-dissolution. At their
margins are groups of small- or large-scale
commercial farmers producing partially differentiated
commodities on the basis of private forms of vertical
coordination. The glue holding these chains together
is a series of relatively opaque and exclusive quality
conventions based on process standards.
The classical agro-commodity chains offered
smailholders broadly-based but shallow upgrading
possibilities, the rewards of which were calculable
and predictable. The new chains offer more
narrowly-based but deeper rewards, although the
basis of the latter's calculation is less transparent. It
is almost certainly impossible to envisage a return
to the system prevaïling in 1930-90. This makes the
policy challenges posed by the new upgrading
opportunities more acute. Two in particular stand
out: first, how to devise forms of regulation that can
make these opportunities more socially broad-
based and, second, how to devise ways of ensuring
that the rewards from meeting them become more
predictable. The first of these challenges is the more
pressing, and seems likely to involve addressing
two sets of questions: finding less demanding
alternatives to current phytosanitary standards, solutions to the provision of common good'
and generalising the experience of institutional
Notes
The figure for LDCs has remained consistently high
over recent decades; the corresponding figure for
1961-65 was 56.3 per cent and for 1976-80 67.7
per cent. Although their share of the agricultural
exports of Latin America and the Caribbean has
dropped by more than half during the period
1961-65 to 1996-99 (from 65.2 to 31.4 per cent),
their share of the agricultural exports of Africa rose
from 52.8 to 59.1 per cent over the same period
(FAOSTAT 2000).
This persists today, for example Tanzanian coffee
plays a central role in the market in Germany, but
nowhere else, etc.
Heijbroek and Husken (1996:28) cite international
comparative data from 1995 on net costs per kg. lint,
which show that - despite very different production
processes - US, Indian and Pakistani cotton had
broadly comparable costs. Australian costs were a
third lower, but Chinese costs were much lower still.
Of course there are exceptions. For example, Ghana
cocoa is considered to be of such a superior flavour
to other cocoas that products based solely on it
command a premium.
The business continues under the old name but on
the basis of a management buy-out.
The main example is the trader Neumann expansion
of own production in Latin America.
E.g. Cargill and ADM in the cocoa sector of Cote
d'Ivoire, the world's leading supplier.
In Kenya, estate coffee production corresponds to ca.
40-60 per cent of total production; in Tanzania it is
set to rise from a pre-liberalisation level of 5 per cent
to around 20 per cent (Ponte 2002).
In the case of 'fair trade' there may be a link to
broader public debates.
Secondary economic grounds are probably present in
the case of Cargill and ADM investments in 'origin
grinding' in Côte d'Ivoire. The combination of
increasing world price volatility, the role played by
Ivorian supply in world price formation, and the high
volumes of local beans that these companies
command may mean that withdrawing large amounts
of beans from Northern markets (where, ceteris
pari bus, grinding them would normally realise a price
100 per cent higher) in order to grind them locally
will generate certain benefits under specific circum
stances.
See also Larsen (2002) on diversification by the
former Zimbabwean cotton parastatal.
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services to smaliholders.
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